In 2016 Mexico gave six million public-school teenagers a permanent social-security number before their first job. Economists have long worried that benefits like this one encourage informal work. This one did the opposite.
Informal work — unregistered, untaxed, unprotected — is the norm in developing labor markets: over 60% of employment worldwide, and around 60% in Mexico, where state rates range from 40% to 80%. It means no pension, no health coverage, more exposure to poverty — and a government that can't tax or reach a majority of its own workforce.
Governments increasingly extend healthcare and social protection to people regardless of employment status — a good idea on its own terms.
But a long-standing objection says this backfires: if a safety net no longer requires a formal job, why bother getting one? Benefits delinked from formal work could subsidize informality at exactly the margin policy is trying to shrink.
Public high-school and college students had been technically entitled to national health coverage (IMSS) since 1998, registered in bulk by their schools under shared numbers nobody used. In 2016, a joint government campaign gave each of 6.6 million students their own permanent social-security number — the same one formal employers use to hire — and told them, loudly, that they had it.
Staying enrolled becomes more valuable, so teenagers work less. ↓ participation.
Healthcare becomes a free complement to an informal job. ↑ participation, ↓ formality.
Holding the SSN that formal jobs require lowers the friction of getting one. ↑ formality.
All three are plausible a priori. Only data on actual labor-market outcomes can tell them apart.
Everyone was eligible at once, so there's no state that got the policy and no state that didn't. But some states started far more informal than others. I compare birth cohorts still in school in 2016 against slightly older cohorts already past school — and ask whether that cohort gap widens more in the states where informality, and so the stakes, were highest.
Long difference, by state s: Ys,post − Ys,pre = β·Is,pre + Xs,preΓ + α + εs, where Is,pre is the state's 2013–15 informality rate and Y is a labor-market outcome for the exposed-minus-unexposed cohort gap. This clean two-group comparison is why the long difference excludes the two partially exposed cohorts (1999–2000, one and two years of high-school exposure respectively). A pooled panel version keeps them: it adds cohort, state, and quarter fixed effects and interacts pre-policy informality with a continuous cohort-level exposure function, 2016–2019, so partial exposure enters with partial weight rather than being dropped. Weights use the square root of the surveyed population in each cell; standard errors are wild-cluster-bootstrapped by state (32 clusters).
percentage points more formal employment,
per point of pre-policy informality
Where informality started highest — exactly where the “delinking” worry should bite hardest — exposed cohorts pulled further ahead of unexposed ones in formal work, not further behind. A state one standard deviation more informal than average saw its cohort formality gap widen by roughly 11 to 17 points — a third to a half of the typical 33-point gap between exposed and unexposed cohorts.
A rise in the formality rate could just mean fewer people work at all. So instead of rates, I decompose the exposed-minus-unexposed gap into shares of the whole cohort population — employed, formal, informal, unemployed, out of the labor force — so the pieces add up by construction.
About two-thirds (0.63pp) is net entry — mostly people who weren't participating at all before (0.59pp), plus a small, imprecise drop in unemployment. The remaining third (0.28pp) is reallocation: work that would have been informal becoming formal instead.
A placebo version — pretending the 1995–98 cohorts were “exposed” relative to 1991–94 — finds a formal-employment coefficient of −0.06 (p = 0.61): a null, once the same controls are applied.
The main threat isn't a confound in the usual sense — it's mean reversion: high-informality (poorer) states converging toward richer ones regardless of any policy. If that convergence already existed among cohorts too old to be exposed, it would show up as drift in this figure before the eligibility ramp.
That's reassuring — but a pass/fail glance at a chart is a weak test with only 32 states, and treating it as a screen would itself distort the inference that follows. So the next step doesn't ask whether the assumption holds. It asks how much it could fail and the result would still stand.
Every cohort-comparison design like this one rests on one assumption: absent the policy, the untreated cohorts' trend is a good stand-in for what the treated cohorts would have done. Nobody can observe that counterfactual directly — and with 32 states, a chart like the one on the last slide can't rule out a violation large enough to matter.
Rambachan & Roth's fix: instead of assuming the violation is exactly zero, let it be anything up to a size M̄, scaled relative to the largest wobble actually observed among cohorts that couldn't have been treated. Then ask — as M̄ grows from zero — at what point does the confidence set for the effect start to include zero. That crossing point is the breakdown value. A big one means the result would survive a violation much larger than anything already visible in the data; a small one means it's fragile.
Schematic — illustrates the logic, not the paper's actual estimates.
Applied to this design — birth cohort as event time, normalized on the last fully unexposed cohort — the formality result survives a post-eligibility violation of parallel cohort trends up to 15% larger than the worst violation already visible among untreated cohorts. The weaker participation margin breaks under a much smaller one. Under a linear-drift restriction that extrapolates the untreated trend forward instead of assuming it away, the formality estimate rises, since that drift already runs against the result.
The procedure needs a full covariance matrix, which the paper's usual wild-cluster bootstrap doesn't supply — cluster-jackknife (CV3) standard errors are used instead, the natural choice with 32 clusters. Using CRV1 instead gives M̄ = 1.38 for formality; normalizing on the following cohort instead of the last unexposed one gives 0.78. Both alternatives point the same direction.
The pattern points to salience and administrative friction, not a change in the price of informal work. The policy didn't make informal jobs more attractive — it made formal ones easier to get, by putting the paperwork formal hiring requires directly in students' hands, before they ever needed it.
The entire formal-employment gain is subordinate wage employment. Formal self-employment doesn't budge — exactly what a hiring-friction story predicts, and not what a change in the returns to working for yourself would produce.
Effects are similar for women and men, for students and non-students, and for youths with a formal or informal head of household — and hold up when the self-employed are dropped entirely.
ENILEMS, a separate survey of high-school graduates with a sharper measure of public-school exposure, reproduces the participation result on its own.
No evidence formal work crowded students out of school — addressing the first of the three opening guesses.
Positive but economically small, and not statistically significant — this is a paper about formal status, not earnings.
Restricting to informal employees only (dropping the self-employed and domestic workers from the informality measure itself) leaves the result intact.
The entitlement existed since 1998. Schools had always kept the rosters. What changed in 2016 wasn't whether the benefit required a job — it never did — but how it reached people: attached to each student individually, inside the contributory system, carrying the exact identifier formal hiring requires, before their first job. A benefit that could have subsidized informality worked instead as an on-ramp into it — the formal side.
The same logic should apply anywhere social protection travels through a channel — a registry, an ID, a payment account — that also happens to lower the cost of a formal transaction.
School-Linked Benefits and Early Formalization in Mexico
The views expressed are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of Banco de México or its Board of Governors.